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1. Introduction 
The significant deterioration of public finances post 2008 has been closely monitored by the 
three major credit rating agencies (CRAs), Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s 
and Fitch Ratings (all three account for 95% of the market share1). Most of the attention has 
focused on the Eurozone countries. In the case of Moody’s, seven downgrades were recorded 
for Greece and five downgrades for Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch Ratings also followed. Decisions made by the CRAs are crucial since sovereign credit 
ratings measure the probability that a country will default on its debt obligations and 
therefore set the tone for the sovereign state’s borrowing costs.  
Earlier work by e.g. Afonso et al. (2011) and Cavallo et al. (2013) (see also the references 
therein) examined sovereign credit ratings based on quantitative and qualitative factors. 
However, an arguably large number of decisions made by the CRAs remain unexplained. 
This has triggered heavy criticism by European politicians, such as Jose Manuel Barroso (the 
EU Commission’s former President) who raised the issue of “deficiencies in their working 
methods”2. 
This paper revisits the determinants of credit rating decisions for the Eurozone countries. Our 
work departs from the earlier literature in three aspects. First, we take into account cross-
sectional dependence that is present in the data. Second, we examine the role of the 
cumulated current account. Third, we assess whether the crisis has impacted on the way 
CRAs make credit rating decisions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the data and our empirical results. 
Section 3 concludes. 
                                                          
1 Economist 31/5/2007 http://www.economist.com/node/9267952 
2  Barroso: Comments to the European Parliament, Wednesday 5 May 2010: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/05/05/eu-barroso-ratings-idUKLDE6442B120100505 
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2. Data description and empirical results 
Our dataset includes annual data from 2002 to 2013 for 18 Eurozone countries (216 
observations in total). Table 1 presents the data employed and their sources. 
Table 1: Data definitions 
Variable Description Source 
Fitch rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year Fitch 
S&P rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year S&P 
Moody’s Rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year Moody’s 
GDP per capital Log GDP per capital, US dollars, constant 2005 prices World Bank 
GDP growth rate Annual percent change of GDP IMF WEO 
Government Debt General government gross debt as a percent of GDP IMF WEO 
Accumulated current 
account Sum of current account balances as a percent of GDP from 1995 IMF WEO 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate as a Percent of total labor force IMF WEO 
Inflation Rate Annual growth rate of Consumer Price Index IMF WEO 
External Balance External balance on goods and services as a percent of GDP World Bank 
Reserves Log of total reserves( includes gold, constant 2005 prices) World Bank 
Regulatory Quality Aggregate Government Indicator World Bank 
 
The variable of interest is the sovereign credit rating. This study employs the linear 
transformation of ratings presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Sovereign Rating grades 
  Rating agency 
Rating 
grades 
  Fitch S&P Moody's (1-21) 
Highest quality AAA AAA Aaa 21 
High quality AA+ AA+ Aa1 20 
  AA AA Aa2 19 
  AA- AA- Aa3 18 
Strong payment  A+ A+ A1 17 
Capacity A A A2 16 
  A- A- A3 15 
Adequate payment BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 14 
Capacity BBB BBB Baa2 13 
  BBB- BBB- Baa3 12 
Likely to fulfill BB+ BB+ Ba1 11 
obligations, ongoing BB BB Ba2 10 
Uncertainty BB- BB- Ba3 9 
High credit  risk B+ B+ B1 8 
  B B B2 7 
  B- B- B3 6 
Very high credit CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 5 
Risk CCC CCC Caa2 4 
  CCC- CCC- Caa3 3 
Non default with CC CC Ca 
 possibility of recovery  C 
  
2 
  DDD SD C 
 Default DD D 
    D 
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The model specification we adopt takes into account the cross-sectional dependence that is 
present in the sample. In line with Gros (2011), we further examine whether the cumulative 
current account is of importance in a monetary union setting. Further, following Baghai et al. 
(2014), we examine whether credit ratings agencies have changed their behavior during the 
crisis. The specification we employ can be written as: 
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where xi includes nine variables, namely GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP, government 
debt, inflation rate, unemployment rate, current account, external balance, log reserves, 
regulatory quality. Dcrisis takes the value of 1 for the years 2009 to 2013 and 0 otherwise. 
Three variables (government debt, current account and external balance) interact with the 
crisis dummy in line with Gros (2011) who argues that the external sector was of vital 
importance during the crisis. 
 
The model is estimated using (i) pooled OLS, (ii) fixed effects and (iii) random effects. The 
Pesaran (2004) test provides convincing evidence that cross sectional dependence exists in 
the models without the cross-section averages ( x : cavg); these preliminary results are not 
reported due to space limitations but are available on request. In fact, cross-sectional 
dependence would point to the existence of spill-over effects from one Eurozone country to 
another3. Following from this, we follow the common correlated effects (CCE) approach of 
Pesaran (2006) that includes the cross-section averages of the independent variables as 
additional regressors denoted by cavg in Tables 3 to 6. The estimated coefficients on the 
cross-section averages are not interpretable in a meaningful way; these are merely present to 
blend out the biasing impact of the unobservable common factor (see e.g. Eberhardt, 2012).  
Tables 3-5 report the empirical results for each one of the three main CRAs. In each model, 
the first two columns report all estimated coefficients and associated p-values (full model 
with cavg) whereas the next two columns report only the statistical significant ones (deleting 
one variable at the time). An improvement in GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, exchange 
reserves and cumulated current account results in a credit rating upgrade (cumulative current 
account’s significance emerges only during the financial crisis). Notice also the positive 
impact of World Bank’s regulatory quality index; this captures perceptions of the ability of 
                                                          
3 De Santis (2014) identifies spill-over effects in terms of the direct impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade 
on other Eurozone sovereign spreads. 
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the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.  
 
Our results further suggest that both an increase of the unemployment and inflation rates 
exert negative impact on credit ratings. We also note (based on the interaction of the post 
2008 dummy variable with the regressors) that, for all CRAs, government debt developments 
and the current account weigh more on credit rating decisions post rather than pre-crisis. For 
instance, the S&P random effects model suggests that the adverse impact of government debt 
doubles from an estimate of -0.037 to an estimate of -0.037-0.030=-0.067. The message is 
very similar from the fixed effects model which is preferred over the random effects one 
based on the Hausman test (reported at the bottom of the table). Indeed, the fixed effects 
model suggests, for S&P, an increase in the government debt impact from -0.042 pre-crisis to 
-0.042-0.024=-0.066 afterwards. Equally important, the adverse impact of government debt 
on credit rating decisions is stronger for Moody’s. Indeed, the fixed effects model (which, 
based on the Hausman test, is preferred over the random effects one) suggests an increase in 
the debt impact from -0.040 pre-crisis to -0.040-0.037=-0.077 afterwards. Hence, ceteris 
paribus, an annual increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio by thirteen percentage points brings 
about one (≈13*0.077) notch downgrade. In our models, this notch downgrade does not 
depend on any particular threshold such as the 90% debt-to-GDP ratio that Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) deem to be of threat for the growth prospects of a particular country. To 
account for this possibility, we re-estimated our models by interacting government debt with 
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if debt-to-GDP is higher than 90% (and 0 otherwise). 
Doing so failed to provide any statistical evidence that CRAs might be more aggressive in 
downgrading countries faced with debt-to-GDP ratios above the 90% threshold. Further, our 
point estimates suggest that Moody’s places more weight on GDP growth and reserves; this 
impact does not change pre- or post-crisis. Finally, the impact of the external balance appears 
largely insignificant (pre- or post-crisis) based on the fixed effects model which is preferred 
by the data. Table 6, which uses the average rating of the three CRAs as dependent variable, 
also suggests that the impact of government debt and the current account is stronger post 
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crisis4. Last, but not least, the Pesaran (2004) suggests, for all models in Tables 3-6, no 
remaining cross-sectional dependence. 
 
Recent research by Livingston et al. (2010) finds that, in the case of corporate bond rating 
decisions, Moody’s has become more conservative (in the sense that it gives more inferior 
ratings) than S&P post-1998 and that investors value “more” decisions made by Moody’s 
than decisions made by S&P. What we find for Eurozone’s sovereign bond market is that 
Moody’s appears to be placing more weight (compared with the remaining CRAs) on fiscal 
stance developments. If, indeed, investors value “more” decisions made by Moody’s, our 
results arguably suggest that any rating upgrades decided by Moody’s on fiscal related 
grounds have the potential of accelerating investor faith in Eurozone’s troubled peripheral 
market (particularly in Greece), therefore triggering a rapid reduction in peripheral sovereign 
bond yields which remained stubbornly elevated during the (recent) financial crisis. 
 
3. Conclusions 
We examine the determinants of credit ratings for the Eurozone countries over the period 
2002-2013 in a panel data model which allows for cross-sectional dependence as a form of 
spill-over effects within Eurozone. Our results suggest that government debt and cumulative 
current account exert a stronger positive impact on credit ratings post-2008 compared to the 
period before. Arguably, our model, which allows for cross-sectional dependence and 
differential impact on credit rating decisions post-2008, could go some way towards shedding 
some light on how CRAs assign sovereign credit ratings. 
                                                          
4 In preliminary analysis, we also used the fiscal balance (as % of GDP) as an extra regressor. This consistently 
entered our models with the wrong (negative) sign; at the same time, the GDP growth coefficient turned 
statistically insignificant. For this reason, we decided to drop the fiscal balance regressor. 
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Table 3: Credit rating models-Fitch 
FITCH
    Pooled OLS                               Fixed Effects     Random Effects
coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val
Log GDP per capita 10.970 0.000 11.086 0.000 4.039 0.365 8.825 0.017 9.195 0.000 9.370 0.000
Log GDP per capita cavg -4.644 0.729 5.716 0.589 -1.586 0.874
GDP growth rate 0.149 0.001 0.149 0.001 0.130 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.152 0.000
GDP growth rate cavg -0.172 0.135 -0.222 0.002 -0.176 0.004 -0.123 0.004 -0.181 0.001 -0.208 0.000
Government Debt -0.032 0.000 -0.033 0.000 -0.043 0.014 -0.040 0.034 -0.024 0.013 -0.024 0.009
Government Debt cavg 0.301 0.033 0.270 0.002 0.202 0.121 0.111 0.000 0.251 0.033 0.260 0.007
Inflation Rate -0.281 0.000 -0.287 0.000 -0.107 0.119 -0.154 0.008 -0.177 0.026 -0.179 0.010
Inflation Rate cavg -0.381 0.251 -0.247 0.127 -0.323 0.202 -0.349 0.007 -0.408 0.040 -0.372 0.037
Unemployment Rate -0.142 0.000 -0.143 0.000 -0.218 0.004 -0.200 0.009 -0.180 0.001 -0.174 0.001
Unemployment Rate cavg -0.723 0.297 -0.561 0.085 -0.278 0.649 -0.552 0.336 -0.612 0.118
Current account -0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.001 0.000 0.985 -0.002 0.735
Current account cavg -0.007 0.864 -0.015 0.558 -0.014 0.566
External Balance -0.062 0.001 -0.062 0.001 -0.008 0.669 -0.070 0.008 -0.079 0.011
External Balance cavg -0.667 0.065 -0.758 0.013 -0.642 0.005 -0.630 0.002 -0.675 0.002
Log Reserves 1.439 0.000 1.440 0.000 -0.133 0.568 0.845 0.004 0.951 0.001
Log reserves cavg -3.421 0.548 -0.955 0.623 -2.527 0.272
Regulatory Quality 0.165 0.659 1.716 0.003 1.953 0.002 1.022 0.059 0.867 0.115
Regulatory Quality cavg 12.704 0.093 10.963 0.056 8.350 0.115 10.491 0.034 10.791 0.031 10.260 0.021
Government Debt * Dcrisis -0.036 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.027 0.003 -0.024 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.034 0.000
Current account * Dcrisis 0.021 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.009 0.248 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.140 0.010 0.043
External Balance * Dcrisis -0.117 0.000 -0.118 0.000 -0.057 0.074 -0.075 0.009 -0.082 0.004 -0.079 0.001
Constant -1.107 0.904 -63.166 0.000 -28.989 0.598 -37.046 0.053 -17.393 0.748 -50.247 0.000
* Robust standard erros
R squared within 0.877 0.853 0.850 0.844
between 0.377 0.638 0.882 0.896
overall 0.901 0.901 0.511 0.677 0.872 0.880
PesaranCross sectional independence test -1.19 Pr=0.2353 1.82 Pr=0.0691 -1.37 Pr=0.1696 -1.33 Pr=0.18
Hausman Specification  Test 54.14 Pr=0.00  
Note: The estimation is carried out in Stata and the robust standard errors are derived using the vce(robust) option in Stata. 
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Table 4: Credit rating models-S&P 
S&P
    Pooled OLS                               Fixed Effects     Random Effects
coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val
Log GDP per capita 10.601 0.000 10.495 0.000 6.079 0.230 11.657 0.020 10.601 0.000 10.734 0.000
Log GDP per capita cavg -10.763 0.461 -3.815 0.743 -10.763 0.244
GDP growth rate 0.131 0.026 0.113 0.049 0.110 0.009 0.113 0.001 0.131 0.012 0.120 0.002
GDP growth rate cavg -0.132 0.284 -0.260 0.000 -0.130 0.012 -0.213 0.000 -0.132 0.029 -0.215 0.000
Government Debt -0.035 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.045 0.002 -0.042 0.014 -0.035 0.003 -0.037 0.000
Government Debt cavg 0.297 0.033 0.089 0.100 0.220 0.045 0.145 0.000 0.297 0.008 0.141 0.000
Inflation Rate -0.285 0.000 -0.261 0.000 -0.139 0.019 -0.216 0.000 -0.285 0.001 -0.239 0.000
Inflation Rate cavg -0.365 0.290 -0.332 0.107 -0.365 0.104
Unemployment Rate -0.091 0.009 -0.117 0.001 -0.182 0.001 -0.183 0.006 -0.091 0.087 -0.143 0.000
Unemployment Rate cavg -0.791 0.274 -0.415 0.410 -0.791 0.131
Current account -0.006 0.190 0.000 0.952 -0.006 0.487
Current account cavg -0.013 0.765 -0.017 0.584 -0.013 0.680
External Balance -0.074 0.000 -0.089 0.000 -0.024 0.311 -0.074 0.017 -0.089 0.000
External Balance cavg -0.561 0.156 -0.536 0.055 -0.559 0.002 -0.760 0.001 -0.561 0.018 -0.549 0.000
Log Reserves 1.309 0.000 1.257 0.000 -0.345 0.223 1.309 0.000 0.530 0.079
Log reserves cavg -5.079 0.438 -2.756 0.305 -5.079 0.093
Regulatory Quality 0.340 0.421 1.138 0.087 1.482 0.045 0.340 0.712
Regulatory Quality cavg 13.004 0.096 10.245 0.023 9.703 0.007 13.004 0.002 9.627 0.000
Government Debt * Dcrisis -0.035 0.000 -0.030 0.000 -0.028 0.001 -0.024 0.000 -0.035 0.000 -0.030 0.000
Current account * Dcrisis 0.020 0.000 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.169 0.015 0.012 0.020 0.003 0.012 0.002
External Balance * Dcrisis -0.095 0.001 -0.070 0.006 -0.033 0.341 -0.053 0.051 -0.095 0.012 -0.045 0.068
Constant 34.773 0.734 -39.781 0.000 21.990 0.677 -49.521 0.040 34.773 0.540 -49.089 0.000
* Robust standard erros
R squared within 0.883 0.845 0.818 0.859
between 0.469 0.700 0.919 0.833
overall 0.890 0.889 0.580 0.706 0.890 0.843
PesaranCross sectional independence test -1.47 Pr=0.1426 -0.39 Pr=0.6969 -1.35 Pr=0.1773 -0.29 Pr=0.77
Hausman Specification  Test 36.60 Pr=0.00  
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Table 5: Credit rating models-Moody’s  
MOODYS
    Pooled OLS                               Fixed Effects     Random Effects
coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val
Log GDP per capita 9.870 0.000 9.909 0.000 -8.231 0.098 8.971 0.000 9.696 0.000
Log GDP per capita cavg -31.486 0.046 -21.783 0.023 -10.934 0.273 -28.582 0.000 -30.194 0.000 -31.353 0.000
GDP growth rate 0.174 0.002 0.177 0.001 0.144 0.01 0.148 0.005 0.170 0.000 0.170 0.000
GDP growth rate cavg -0.119 0.347 -0.103 0.044 -0.115 0.058 -0.114 0.064
Government Debt -0.034 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.049 0.024 -0.040 0.037 -0.032 0.000 -0.035 0.000
Government Debt cavg 0.555 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.515 0.001 0.599 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.544 0.000
Inflation Rate -0.155 0.014 -0.162 0.007 -0.051 0.364 -0.136 0.128 -0.153 0.070
Inflation Rate cavg -1.059 0.005 -1.327 0.000 -1.063 0.005 -1.385 0.000 -1.049 0.001 -1.055 0.001
Unemployment Rate -0.112 0.004 -0.114 0.004 -0.308 0.011 -0.265 0.001 -0.145 0.013 -0.150 0.009
Unemployment Rate cavg -2.179 0.006 -1.541 0.004 -1.814 0.007 -2.277 0.001 -2.089 0.000 -2.114 0.000
Current account -0.003 0.495 0.007 0.284 0.004 0.573
Current account cavg -0.053 0.206 -0.053 0.021 -0.060 0.006 -0.058 0.009 -0.056 0.011
External Balance -0.087 0.000 -0.094 0.000 -0.030 0.289 -0.103 0.002 -0.096 0.009
External Balance cavg -0.916 0.015 -0.931 0.000 -0.849 0.002 -0.893 0.000 -0.906 0.000
Log Reserves 1.541 0.000 1.529 0.000 0.125 0.680 1.318 0.000 1.280 0.000
Log reserves cavg -9.231 0.177 -18.061 0.000 -7.498 0.009 -13.251 0.000 -8.913 0.010 -8.902 0.011
Regulatory Quality 0.241 0.484 2.038 0.000 2.142 0.003 0.686 0.144
Regulatory Quality cavg 24.522 0.002 32.347 0.000 21.121 0.002 28.056 0.000 23.733 0.000 2.468 0.000
Government Debt * Dcrisis -0.041 0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.039 0.002 -0.037 0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.041 0.000
Current account * Dcrisis 0.018 0.005 0.016 0.004 0.002 0.749 0.013 0.026 0.012 0.074 0.015 0.002
External Balance * Dcrisis -0.103 0.001 -0.096 0.001 -0.050 0.214 -0.077 0.048 -0.082 0.007 -0.089 0.003
Constant 152.270 0.171 187.996 0.004 141.851 0.009 230.955 0.000 150.616 0.011 152.235 0.011
* Robust standard erros
R squared within 0.889 0.874 0.849 0.844
between 0.022 0.193 0.913 0.914
overall 0.891 0.887 0.082 0.443 0.886 0.885
PesaranCross sectional independence test -0.641 Pr=0.5214 -0.623 Pr=0.5333 -0.791 Pr=0.4291 -0.752 Pr=0.42
Hausman Specification  Test 46.940 Pr=0.00  
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Table 6: Credit rating models-Average Rating 
AvRating
    Pooled OLS                               Fixed Effects     Random Effects
coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val coef. p -val
Log GDP per capita 10.481 0.000 10.167 0.000 0.629 0.881 2.740 0.504 9.497 0.000 9.934 0.000
Log GDP per capita cavg -15.631 0.250 -3.011 0.750 -14.005 0.082
GDP growth rate 0.152 0.003 0.147 0.005 0.128 0.002 0.140 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.141 0.000
GDP growth rate cavg -0.141 0.215 -0.236 0.001 -0.136 0.004 -0.197 0.000 -0.144 0.005 -0.087 0.020
Government Debt -0.034 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.046 0.004 -0.035 0.035 -0.029 0.001 -0.034 0.000
Government Debt cavg 0.384 0.005 0.278 0.001 0.312 0.010 0.334 0.000 0.354 0.001 0.162 0.000
Inflation Rate -0.241 0.000 -0.233 0.000 -0.099 0.069 -0.117 0.017 -0.182 0.011 -0.184 0.002
Inflation Rate cavg -0.602 0.065 -0.320 0.048 -0.572 0.021 -0.539 0.008 -0.619 0.003 -0.577 0.000
Unemployment Rate -0.115 0.001 -0.118 0.001 -0.236 0.001 -0.254 0.001 0.148 0.002 -0.167 0.000
Unemployment Rate cavg -1.231 0.071 -0.658 0.041 -0.836 0.115 -0.910 0.009 -1.122 0.022
Current account -0.007 0.070 0.002 0.682 0.000 0.936
Current account cavg -0.024 0.540 -0.028 0.238 -0.030 0.209
External Balance -0.074 0.000 -0.086 0.000 -0.021 0.255 -0.090 0.001 -0.085 0.002
External Balance cavg -0.715 0.044 -0.794 0.007 -0.711 0.001 -0.900 0.000 -0.687 0.001
Log Reserves 1.430 0.000 1.406 0.000 -0.118 0.610 1.080 0.000 0.773 0.007
Log reserves cavg -5.910 0.318 -3.737 0.077 -5.421 0.045 -9.968 0.000
Regulatory Quality 0.249 0.482 1.631 0.001 1.797 0.002 0.763 0.165
Regulatory Quality cavg 16.743 0.022 13.972 0.012 13.239 0.010 14.429 0.005 15.700 0.001 19.772 0.000
Government Debt * Dcrisis -0.037 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.031 0.001 -0.034 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.033 0.000
Current account * Dcrisis 0.020 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.007 0.314 0.012 0.030 0.012 0.061 0.013 0.001
External Balance * Dcrisis -0.105 0.000 -0.089 0.001 -0.047 0.162 -0.071 0.022 -0.076 0.011 -0.069 0.001
Constant 58.658 0.536 -62.194 0.000 44.950 0.335 -18.289 0.318 55.772 0.268 37.400 0.065
* Robust standard erros
R squared within 0.905 0.885 0.869 0.867
between 0.166 0.405 0.906 0.906
overall 0.905 0.903 0.375 0.565 0.895 0.894
PesaranCross sectional independence test -0.722 Pr=0.4703 -0.035 Pr=0.9723 -0.989 Pr=0.3227 1.719 Pr=0.08
Hausman Specification  Test 79.340 Pr=0.00  
